One of the greatest objects of judicial activity and academic commentary in European Union (EU) law has been the free movement of goods. The free movement of goods continues to generate intense debates because it is at the intersection of complex and difficult choices between public regulation and market freedom, on the one hand, and EU and state powers on the other. This chapter provides an overview of such debates and how they affected the development of EU law on the (...) free movement of goods. It uses the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to identify some specificities of the European system. Under the GATT, discrimination tests are preceded by a market equivalence analysis of the relevant products, requiring an economic and empirical analysis of the market prior to determining whether the products are subject to differentiated treatment. (shrink)

Resumimos la información aportada por estudios científicos recientes sobre las opiniones, visiones y actitudes de los cazadores españoles sobre la caza y su gestión. En concreto, discutimos las distintas funciones que atribuyen los cazadores a la actividad cinegética, así como los juicios morales asociados a diversas motivaciones para cazar. Seguidamente, exploramos las valoraciones expresadas por cazadores y gestores respecto a ciertas herramientas de gestión cinegética, y discutimos sobre cómo éstas influyen en la toma de decisiones. Por último, exploramos las posibles (...) tendencias futuras de esta actividad, a partir de lo expresado por los propios cazadores. (shrink)

The text is part of the investigative concerns from the authors with regard to the dialogue between literature and science teaching. It starts from several theoretical approaches around the general didactics, university or superior didactics, science’s didactics and for last, literature’s didactics. This is largely due to our search which is focused in articulate the university didactics with science and literature’s didactics, meanwhile, we pretend to answer to the questions ¿How are the specific didactics of science and literature going to (...) contribute to the university didactics and how is the last one going to contribute to these specific didactics? ¿Is it the dialogue between science and literature possible? The paper has been made in middle education, in Educative Institution José Miguel de Restrepo y Puerta, from Copacabana and also in university education, in the academic unities of Dietetics and Nutrition School, Agricultural Sciences and Medicine, from the University of Antioquia. Finally, the partial results indicate: i) the necessity of general Didactics as a discipline focused on teaching and learning processes to ask itself for its internal problems and establish relations with specific didactics. (shrink)

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...) there must be a transcendent realm of norms. _Naturalism and Normativity_ engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism. They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them—yet one that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

La idea de amor, central en el pensamiento de María Zambrano, evoca la unidad del ser humano con la naturaleza y también la inquietante búsqueda del amor perdido que se inicia con el nacimiento de la conciencia. Al principio se manifestó en las cosmogonías. Luego se escindió en dos géneros: la tragedia relata el amor pasión y la filosofía el amor al saber. La separación crece a lo largo de la historia occidental.

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Resumen: La tolerancia es un privilegio de los poderosos. Una persona puede tolerar sólo si tiene el poder para interferir con aquello que objeta. En este artículo analizaré las circunstancias en las que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar. Argumentaré que la respuesta debe incorporar consideraciones tanto prácticas como metafísicas. Específicamente, defenderé que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar cuando sus propiedades fundan tal poder en la situación práctica en que ella se encuentra, según es caracterizada por sus intereses prácticos. (...) Al hacerlo criticaré el análisis del mencionado poder realizado por Glen Newey. (shrink)

The first comprehensive survey of the criticisms of Leibniz's philosophical optimism in the first half of the eighteenth century, when what has been called the ‘debacle of the perfect world’ first began.

Se trata de un libro que no está hecho para el gran público, puesto que no se trata de una novela. Es un estudio concienzudo de la posición de la obra de Anselm Desing en el siglo XVIII.

Today most philosophers in the English-speaking world adhere to “naturalist” credos that philosophy is continuous with science, and that the natural sciences provide a complete account of all that exists. This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism in order to defend a more inclusive or liberal naturalism.

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming ). According to this (...) model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness _tout court_, i.e., as the _ratio essendi_ of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. (shrink)

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called “placement problem”, which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use (...) three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the “reconciliation problem”, which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed. (shrink)

The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided (...) by the natural sciences. Our authors collectively believe that holding scientific naturalism up for philosophical scrutiny and challenging its misconceptions is of the first importance both for understanding ourselves and our place in the world; and, also, for the future direction of philosophy itself. (shrink)

This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a ...

Basándome en la interpretación de Frederick Neuhouser 2014, examino varios aspectos usualmente no desarrollados en la literatura secundaria sobre una de las herramientas metódicas de la cual se sirve Rousseau en su _Discurso sobre el Origen de la Desigualdad entre los Hombres_ : la así llamada “historia conjetural”. En concreto, examino las respuestas que daría Rousseau a las siguientes tres preguntas: 1) ¿cuáles son los criterios de éxito de tal artefacto metódico? 2) ¿hasta qué punto Rousseau puede estar seguro de (...) la superioridad de su posición frente a teorías alternativas? 3) ¿hasta qué punto es admisible sin objeciones la imagen que Rousseau nos presenta del estado puro de naturaleza? Respecto a la primera pregunta, ofrezco dos criterios cuya inspiración es el falsacionismo de Karl Popper. Respecto a la segunda pregunta, discuto principalmente con la interpretación de Nicholas Dent 2005. Finalmente, en la tercera pregunta considero tanto una objeción kantiana como una objeción hegeliana al _DI_, mostrando al mismo tiempo que estas objeciones no aplican si entendemos con mayor precisión el proyecto del _DI_. (shrink)

This is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview of liberal naturalism. Essential reading for students and researchers in all areas of philosophy it will be of particular interest for those studying philosophical naturalism, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics.

The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took lace at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo...

This work intends to be a generalization and a simplification of the techniques employed in [2], by the proposal of a general strategy to prove satisfiability theorems for NLGM-s (= normal logics with graded modalities), analogously to the well known technique of the canonical models by Lemmon and Scott for classical modal logics.

The research analyzes the teledentistry service applied in health services during COVID-19, studying the quality of the teledentistry service and the level of satisfaction of patients treated with this care model. A sample of 341 patients was worked on, using the SERVQUAL model. The results showed a statistically significant relationship between quality of service in teledentistry and patient satisfaction (p<0.05), where 34.9% patients perceived low quality of service and dissatisfaction, while 33.7% were pleased with the care. We conclude that, given (...) the dental health difficulties, the population of the Peruvian central jungle is dissatisfied with the teledentistry service. (shrink)

Despite the emergence of computer games as a dominant cultural industry, we know little or nothing about the ethics of computer games. Considerations of the morality of computer games seldom go beyond intermittent portrayals of them in the mass media as training devices for teenage serial killers. In this first scholarly exploration of the subject, Miguel Sicart addresses broader issues about the ethics of games, the ethics of playing the games, and the ethical responsibilities of game designers. He argues (...) that computer games are ethical objects, that computer game players are ethical agents, and that the ethics of computer games should be seen as a complex network of responsibilities and moral duties. Players should not be considered passive amoral creatures; they reflect, relate, and create with ethical minds. The games they play are ethical systems, with rules that create gameworlds with values at play. Drawing on concepts from philosophy and game studies, Sicart proposes a framework for analyzing the ethics of computer games as both designed objects and player experiences. After presenting his core theoretical arguments and offering a general theory for understanding computer game ethics, Sicart offers case studies examining single-player games, multiplayer games, and online gameworlds from an ethical perspective. He explores issues raised by unethical content in computer games and its possible effect on players and offers a synthesis of design theory and ethics that could be used as both analytical tool and inspiration in the creation of ethical gameplay. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism. Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately (...) reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**. (shrink)